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Physical and social transformation processes that take place in urban contexts with strong spatial growth
and hardly any economic development frequently have signiﬁcant adverse impacts for the affected
people, which tend to be made invisible. This paper presents an analytical framework to explore different
ways to approach urban transformation processes (supply side), their impacts on the set of needs of the
community (demand side) and their consequences on the urban environment as a whole (context). The
proposed method has been used to assess three actions related to the physical and social transformation
of the largest self-made settlement in the city of Dakar, Senegal, during the 2005e2012 period. Research
ﬁndings show how exogenous interests are privileged over the common good when the affected citizens
are not effectively involved in decision-making processes.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In an urban context with spatial growth and scant economic
development, slum upgrading in self-made settlements becomes a
key management issue in many countries of the South (Jenkins,
Abiko, Frediani, & Moraes, 2010). Nevertheless, several authors
(Burgess, Carmona, & Kolstee, 1997; Davis, 2006; Frediani, 2007;
Payne, 2002; Payne, Durand-Lasserve, & Rakodi, 2009) have
noted that this type of programme, though justiﬁed for improving
physical aspects of the self-made settlements, can have very
negative impacts for the settlers themselves as well as for the urban
environment as a whole. In fact, these programmes frequently
entail the eviction of residents and tend to aggravate social segre-
gation and inequities. In the case of Dakar city (Senegal), estima-
tions indicate that slum upgrading programmes have evicted
nearly 70% of original residents (Durand Lasserve & Ndiaye, 2008).
As recognised by a World Bank report (World Bank, 2001), these
upgrading processes generally imply “involuntary relocation” and
frequently end up in loss of economic activities and destruction of
mutual-support social networks among residents. Moreover, theseez de Andres), josemiguel.
hw.ac.uk (H. Smith).negative impacts tend to be made invisible (Shiva, 2005) either
because of lack of interest in assessing the programmes' outcomes
(Jenkins et al., 2010) or because the programmes are assessed by
their own promoters and not by their recipients (Alvarez, 2013).
On the other hand, since the 1990s it has been widely accepted
that self-made settlements are not the problem, but the solution
found by people to satisfy their housing needs (Bredenoord & van
Lindert, 2010; Burgess, 1992; Burgess et al., 1997; Gaye, 1992;
Jenkins, Smith, & Wang, 2007; Moser, 1998; Purcell, 2002; Tunas
& Peresthu, 2010). Slum residents are not passive agents; on the
contrary, they put a lot of effort into building their houses and
neighbourhoods (Fall, 2007; Gaye, 1992; Landman and Napier,
2010; Mitlin, 2008; Neuwirt, 2011). Nevertheless, it is still a sig-
niﬁcant challenge to get governments and funding agencies to
recognize them as active agents of change and, therefore, support
their efforts (Satterthwaite, 2008).
For this reason, it is critical that policies, programmes and ac-
tions oriented to urban transformation contribute decisively to
satisfy the needs of the affected people and to improve the urban
environment as a whole. That is why a growing number of scholars
(Fernandez-Güell, 2006; Marais & Ntema, 2013; Peris, Acebillo-
Baque, & Calabuig, 2011; Scott, Cotton, & Sohail Khan, 2013;
Taleai, Sliuzas, & Flacke, 2014) have argued the need to take into
consideration the complexity of these processes. The
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elements and the stakeholders involved in urban processes add
difﬁculty to the analysis. In order to fully understand the spatial and
social transformation processes in large urban areas, it is necessary
to analyze at least three elements: the multidimensional needs of
residents (Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 2010); the process
dynamics generated by stakeholders (Escobar, 2005; Frediani,
2007); and the societal, economic, physical and political context
in which the transformation takes place.
Other authors (Post & Mwangi, 2009; Ridge & Wright, 2008)
emphasize that these analyses should be carried out in real con-
texts, generally characterized by unequal power relations (Chang,
2008), in which the interests of minority groups tend to prevail
over the needs of the overall community (Harvey, 2012; Jenkins
et al., 2007). Lastly, the importance of incorporating the experi-
ence and knowledge of those affected by the transformation pro-
cesses should be stressed (Frediani, 2007; Maf-Neef et al., 2010;
Wresinnski, 1980).
This paper presents a method to analyze spatial and social
transformation processes based on two key components. Firstly, a
so-called “functional system”, based on a systemic approach
(Kauffman, 1995; Von Bertalanffy, 1968; Waldrop, 1992), is used to
analyze the complexities of the case studies. Secondly, the process
of gathering information has been carried out following a bottom-
up approach so as to incorporate on an equal basis the opinions of
stakeholders and affected people. This method has been used to
assess three recent transformation cases (2005e2012) undertaken
in the suburbs of Dakar and promoted by different agents: National
Government (case 1), development agencies (case 2) and common
citizens (case 3). The three initiatives took place in Pikine Irregular
South (PIS), a settlement traditionally ignored by public institutions
and characterized by high levels of social exclusion, poverty, and
physical deterioration (see Fig. 1).
The proposed method has contributed to make visible the im-
pacts generated by diverse initiatives on the needs of the resident
population and on the urban environment. In addition, the research
has shown the unbalanced relations between stakeholders andFig. 1. Location of PIS and case studies in Dakar region.
Source: Authors, based on information from (Republique du Senegal, 2006).how the interests of promoters and managers of public policies
prevail over the community's general interest.
This study makes three major contributions. Firstly, the
analytical method demonstrates its validity to analyze complex
social-spatial transformation processes. Secondly, case studies
show that in order to improve citizens' living conditions, actions for
transforming self-made settlements must pursue the satisfaction of
residents needs in an integrated way (Max-Neef et al., 2010), must
avoid the prevalence of external interests (Jenkins et al., 2007;
Michelutti & Smith 2014), and must involve residents in the
decision-making process (Escobar 2005; Frediani, 2007). Lastly, the
study presents a detailed analysis of the spatial and social trans-
formation process that is taking place in the Dakar region.
The paper is structured in six parts. After the introduction, the
method used in the research is explained, including the analytical
framework which was applied in the research as a basis for un-
derstanding the case studies. Part 3 presents the context in which
the case studies have evolved. Part 4 and 5 present research ﬁnd-
ings from initiatives promoted by the public authorities (cases 1 &
2) and the citizens (case 3). Part 6 reﬂects the tentative conclusions
that can be withdrawn from the ﬁndings.2. Method, case studies selection and data collection
2.1. Analytical framework
This research aims to assess the extent to which actors whose
role is in great part justiﬁed, at least in theory, on the basis of
working towards the improvement in people's living conditions
(national and local governments, ‘aid’ agencies), really respond to
this objective in their real practices in transforming the territory. In
addition, the research aims to assess the consequences of their
actions on the residents and the urban context.
To fulﬁl this purpose, a so-called “functional system”, based on
complexity and systems theory (Kauffman, 1995; Von Bertalanffy,
1968; Waldrop, 1992), has been designed to conceptualize and
expose the complex relationships among demand, supply, and
E. Alvarez de Andres et al. / Habitat International 49 (2015) 187e196 189context (see Fig. 2).
The concept of demand refers to the requirement, by residents, to
satisfy a set of needs e social, economic, physical and political. The
concept of supply is meant hereby as a series of operational pro-
cesses and agents which try, at least according to their stated aims,
to provide satisfaction to people's needs. The concept of context is
understood as a series of economic, spatial, societal and political
factors that shape and affect the operation of an urban area.
Meeting people's needs is at the centre of the functional system,
as is shown in Fig. 2. Our starting point is that the legitimate ulti-
mate aim of most actions which transform the territory (in terms of
human impact) is the improvement of residents' living conditions.
Even in cases of operations to transform the territory where there
are other interests, which are often ‘hidden’, the explicit public
justiﬁcation given for them is precisely the improvement of citi-
zens' living conditions in general, and of those directly affected in
particular, as the case studies presented in this paper show.
The analytical framework was designed taking this ‘rhetorical’
positioning as a starting point, which does not mean that we ignore
the interests that motivate those promoting and managing pro-
cesses of transformation of the territory to act. The intention in
applying the functional system as an analytical tool is precisely to
contribute to showing the gap between the rhetoric that is used to
justify the implementation of such processes and their real con-
sequences on both meeting demand and shaping the supply and
context overall. Applying the functional system as a tool to analyze
real cases of territorial transformation can help to make visible the
‘hidden’ interests of the various actors.
In order to understand the characteristics of a particular func-
tional system as deﬁned above (see Fig. 2), its components can be
explored by addressing the following questions:
 How has demand been deﬁned and recognised?
 How has supply been geared towards satisfying the demand,
and how has this supply been structured and organized?
 To what extent has the implementation of the initiative
contributed to improving (or not) the context (e.g. in terms of
economic self-sufﬁciency, environmental sustainability, social
equity and institutional legitimacy e Alvarez, 2013; Belil, Borja,
& Corti, 2012; Fernandez-Güell, 2006)?
In summary, this is a heuristic instrument used to understand
the reality.2.2. Premises of the research
The research was based on the following pre-establishedFig. 2. Functional system. Acronyms employed: Citizens (CT); Local Leaders (LL); Local Governm
Local Support Organizations (LSO).
Source: Authors.premises:
 In order to explore real cases, it uses a case study approach
(Anderson, 1983; Gersick, 1988; Harris & Sutton, 1986; Kidder,
1982; Pinﬂeld, 1986).
 The researcher is not a neutral agent (Jenkins et al., 2007;
Myrdal, 1972), and we acknowledge our positioning in favour
of processes that empower people to meet their needs, which
entails questioning relations of power, whilst at the same time
ensuring that this does not detract from a rigorous application of
social science methods (Alvarez, 2013).
 Data collection in this kind of research needs to be structured
from bottom up, with the aim of giving voice to the widest
possible range of actors, particularly those who tend to be
rendered ‘invisible’ (Freire, 1970; Maf-Neef et al., 2010; Wre-
sinski, 1980).2.3. Data collection and analysis
Data collection and analysis comprised four stages: immersion
(description); systematic data collection (classiﬁcation); data pro-
cessing (making connections); and drawing conclusions (producing
an account) (Frediani, 2007).
With regard to the immersion (description) stage, the research
reported on in this paper was supported from its inception by All
Together for Dignity (ATD) Fourth World, which has over 25 years
of experience in supporting the most vulnerable households in the
settlement that this paper focuses on. This support was invaluable
in enabling the researchers to access the views of those affected by
the processes of peri-urban transformation in Dakar that were
explored in the research. In 2008 the research was made part of a
wider action-research process that was initiated to develop a closer
link between ATD and the university that the lead investigator was
based at. This university has contributed to actions supported by
ATD (case study 3 below) by collecting data, developing plans and
helping local leaders and ATD present their initiatives and out-
comes to local and national authorities. This link wasmade possible
through the continuous presence on site, since 2008, of ﬁnal year
students and researchers. ATD's direct involvement in the research
reported on in this paper took place through introducing the re-
searchers to the neighbourhoods so as to enable the organisation of
focus groups, providing feedback on the design of the research, and
sharing their analysis of the ﬁndings (i.e. they contributed to
achieving a degree of co-production of the research).
Systematic data collection (classiﬁcation) took place between
2009 and 2012. Documents and grey literature on the case studiesent (LG); National Government (NG); Private Sector (PS); Ofﬁcial Development Aid (ODA);
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held with citizens who were affected by the case study initiatives,
with the objective of deﬁning and analysing the range of needs, as
well as the way in which these were met, or not, by the various
actors in each of the case studies. Assessment of needs was based
on the theory of human needs developed by the Escuela de
Desarrollo a Escala Humana (EDEH e School of Development at the
Human Scale e see Max-Neef et al., 2010), which argues that hu-
man needs are few, ﬁnite and universal, and that what changes in
space and time are not those needs, but the way in which they are
met. Group participants were segmented by sex, age and vulnera-
bility risk in four groups: adult men, adult women, youth and so-
cially excluded population. In addition, ﬁfty-six semi-structured
interviews were held with stakeholders to contrast with focus
group contributions. Stakeholders belonged to development
agencies, National Government, municipalities, NGOs and local
leaders. Altogether, 196 persons participated in the research
project.
Data processing (making connections) and drawing of conclu-
sions (producing an account) took place from 2012 to 2014. Finally,
in June 2014 the research ﬁndings were disseminated in Dakar,
through video presentations in the settlements affected by the case
study initiatives, as well as at the newly established “Ministere de la
reestructuration et de l'amenagemet des zones d'inondaction”
(MRAZI), the latter being attended by participants in the research
involved in all three case studies: national and local authorities,
NGOs, ATD members and people affected by the initiatives. Over
150 people took part in the local dissemination events.
2.4. Case studies selection
The explanatory power of the tool was tested with three cases
that reﬂect the spatial and social transformation of peri-urban
Dakar. These cases were selected in order to be comparable, as
they share the same demand and context, but at the same time they
differ in the relationship patterns among stakeholders. In other
words, the selected cases show different ways of implementing
policies and actions, while they purport to satisfy similar demands
(at least in their rhetoric) and operate within the same context.
As is detailed in the following section, the three selected case
studies affected residents in peri-urban Dakar, and more specif-
ically Pikine Irregular South. In all the selected cases, the stated
justiﬁcation for the initiative was the improvement of living con-
ditions of Dakar citizens in general, and of those directly affected in
particular. In case study 1, for example, it was stated that the plan
had emerged with the intention of responding to the problem of
ﬂooding at a national level, establishing the objective of “allowing
each family affected by ﬂooding to access decent housing, based on
their means and needs” (ENDA, 2008:82). In case 2, it was stated
that the action would contribute to generate new jobs, achieve
territorial equilibrium and improve urban mobility (Republique du
Senegal-APIX, 2007); in addition, following World Bank stated
policies, those affected were to see their living conditions improved
or at least maintained, as is detailed further in the following section
(World Bank, 2001). However, once both initiatives had been
implemented, according to experts the works had not succeeded in
ﬁghting ﬂoods (case 1) or generating employment and improving
territorial equilibrium (case 2). Moreover, those affected by both
these cases maintained that they had been impoverished and their
social networks weakened or dispersed. In addition to their stated
aims to meet demand, both cases were selected because their
analysis allowed an exploration of how public authorities operate
in practice in transforming peri-urban Dakar. Case 1 provides an
illustration of the national government's modus operandi, while
case 2 exempliﬁes the practices of international actors such as theWorld Bank or ﬁrms based in the Global North.
Case study 3 shows the reaction of a community affected by the
previous two cases (1 and 2). Given the absence of an effective
response from the authorities to this community's needs, it decided
to self-organize and act using its own resources (such as time,
voluntary work, etc.). This case was selected to illustrate how res-
idents can act in a bottom-up approach.
The next section presents the context for, and further detail on,
each of the three case studies. This is followed by the ﬁndings from
the case studies, which are grouped to present ﬁndings from cases
promoted by public authorities on the one hand (case studies 1 and
2) and a bottom-up initiativeon the other (case 3).
3. Case studies context
In this section a brief historical and contextual description is
given of the study area so as to provide a better understanding of
the urban transformation processes.
3.1. The origins of pikine
Pikine was founded in the seventies as a provisional camp to
accommodate displaced people from the centre of Dakar by an
urban renovation programme (Verniere, 1977; Salem, 1998; Dorier-
Apprill, 2000). Despite being located far away from the center on a
ﬂoodplain, and serviced by poor infrastructures, Pikine soon
became the main attraction pole in the Dakar area for people with
low-income. Pikine Irregular South (PIS), made up of 5 communes
belonging to the Department of Pikine, has developed over four
decades thanks to the efforts of its residents. Nowadays, Pikine
occupies a strategic position within the Dakar region because it is
surrounded by the Senegal's main distribution centres and it is
located between the administrative-economic district and the new
urban areas planned by the former government of AbdoulayeWade
(2000e2012) (see Fig. 1).
3.2. Present context of PIS: vulnerability to slum clearance and
ﬂooding
Pikine is in the Dakar region, which occupies only 0028% of the
country's land, but it concentrates 80% of its economic activity and
22% of its population (Republique du Senegal-APIX, 2007). A strong
real estate pressure in the region forced the National Government
in 2000 to request an urban and ﬁnancial audit report of Dakar
(Republique du Senegal-APIX, 2006:32). Audit ﬁndings concluded
that taking into consideration the lack of land for urban uses in
Dakar, Pikine's irregular settlements had to be converted to
“formal” urban land. Given that 85% of PIS residents are not
“formal” tenants (Republique du Senegal-APIX, 2006: 71e77), ac-
cording to a 1964 Law (Republique du Senegal, 1964) the Govern-
ment can evict them without compensation if a “public interest
programme” is approved. Since the settlement is strategically
located within the Dakar region, it is no surprise that PIS is
particularly prone to attracting “public interest programmes”, as is
shown in actions promoted by the National Government (case 1)
and by development agencies (case 2) (see Fig. 1).
Furthermore, since 1989 PIS faces a recurrent ﬂooding problem.
According to the authorities, the problem is mostly due to the
irregular occupation of land; however, experts and residents point
out the lack of public investment in building a drainage system.
Under these circumstances, residents have been ﬁghting for several
decades to protect their houses and settlement from ﬂooding (see
Fig. 3) and voicing their disagreement with any proposal aimed at
removing them from the settlement.
Fig. 3. View of ﬂooding problem.
Source: Authors.
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In response to the ﬂooding problem in PIS, the National Gov-
ernment decided to start a new programme called “Plan Jaxaay”
(case 1). After the ﬂood disaster of 2005, President Abdulaye Wade
proposed to get the victims out of the water “as an eagle would do”.
The National Government, through the Ministry of Housing
(MUHCH), promised to build 3000 new dwellings for the affected
citizens 22 km away from the centre of Dakar. The initiative's
estimated cost was 79 million euro. This action resulted in the
forced relocation of 30,000 persons (Republique du Senegal e
MHUCH, 2009). While the Government considered that this ac-
tion successfully solved the settlers' problems, the experts
considered this programme to be inefﬁcient (World Bank, 2010)
and the citizens themselves felt deceived by the Government and
considered that they have been impoverished.
On the other hand, in order to attract direct foreign investment,
the National Government proposed a set of urban mega-projects
consisting of building a new airport, a business district and a spe-
cial economic zone. For these new urban projects to be viable, the
World Bank considered that a new toll highway was needed to
connect them with the centre of Dakar, and in fact conditioned the
ﬁnancial support to the development of the so called “Highway of
the Future” (case 2). The Agency for Investment Promotion and
Major Projects (APIX, from its name in French) would be respon-
sible for implementing and monitoring the proposed project. The
French corporation Eiffage, with a long-standing presence in
Senegal, would build the highway, ﬁnance 40% of the total cost and
be entitled for commercial exploitation during the next 30 years.
The total cost was estimated at 305 million euro (Republique du
Senegal-APIX, 2007).
It was argued that the proposed highway would generate new
jobs, achieve territorial equilibrium and improve urban mobility.
Furthermore, since the project was promoted by the World Bank,
this institution would be obliged to comply with its operational
policy OP.4.12 about “involuntary relocation”. Among other mea-
sures, this policy establishes that the Bank must reduce to a mini-
mum the number of involuntary relocations; it must compensate
losses borne by affected residents through replacement costs, dis-
regarding their tenure condition; it must relocate the affected
persons in an equivalent settlement to the original one; and it must
involve citizens in the decisionmaking process (World Bank, 2001).
Despite these conditions, the ﬁnal highway layout produced ﬁvetimes more relocation of residents than other alternative routes.
Moreover, the new relocation settlement is 35 km away from the
centre of Dakar; it has a density of 4 inhabitants/ha; and it lacks any
signiﬁcant economic activity.
Besides all this, the World Bank later recognized that the pro-
gramme might not improve the territorial balance, the manager of
APIX stated that the highway was not going to improve urban
mobility by itself, and affected citizens declared that they have been
impoverished and their social network has been broken.
In this context, the citizens of Guinaw Rails Nord (GRN), which is
one of the ﬁve communes of Pikine, decided tomobilize themselves
as reaction to the lack of effective response by the public authorities
to their real needs (case 3). This popular action was supported by
All Together for Dignity (ATD) Fourth World, an international
movement dedicated to ﬁghting extreme poverty worldwide, and it
was aimed at strengthening GRN residents' capabilities to act as a
collective group. A local team was created to ﬁght the ﬂooding
problem by building andmaintaining a drainage system. The action
was carried out with simple means accessible to all residents
(boots, picks and shovels) so that everyone at GRN could participate
in the collective effort (see Fig. 4). Thanks to this initiative, GRN
residents are expected to remain in the settlement, which is located
only 12 km away from Dakar centre, it has a compact high density
(400 inhabitants/ha) and it has a dense fabric of economic activ-
ities. The total cost of this popular initiative during the 2009e2010
period was of V 2104 (Alvarez, 2013).
It is worth noting that the agents in charge of promoting and
implementing the three initiatives consider that their actions have
contributed to improving the living conditions of residents.4. Findings from the application of the analytical framework
to the assessment of initiatives promoted by public
authorities (cases 1 & 2)
In this section, the ﬁndings from the application of the analytical
framework to the cases promoted by public authorities (cases 1&2)
are presented and discussed (see Fig. 5). The ﬁndingswere obtained
from the focus groups with people affected by the case study ini-
tiatives and then cross-checked with both the stakeholders
(through semi-structured interviews) and the existing public
documents.
Fig. 4. Drainage system built by citizens.
Source: Authors.
Fig. 5. Display of functional system in cases 1 & 2.
Source: Authors.
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In both cases, the satisfaction of the needs of the affected resi-
dents was not addressed in an integrated manner by the actors
promoting the initiatives. Public agencies held the view that
physical improvements “inevitably” involved the relocation of a
substantial number of residents to other settlements distant fromactivity nodes, with lower urban densities and fewer facilities.
With reference to physical needs, the residents affected in case 1
have come from enjoying informal tenure to having no tenure at all;
from living in 5e8 room houses to moving to 3 room dwellings
where they cannot accommodate large families of 10e15 persons.
In case 2, despite conditions established in Operational Policy 4.12,
affected residents were compensated for their losses with only 50%
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With regard to infrastructures, households with lower incomes
were excluded from the water and electricity systems because they
could not afford the installation costs. In the new settlements,
health and educational services were less diverse and access to the
transport network was more costly.
As far as economic, societal and political needs, it was observed
that these were not taken into consideration either in practice or in
the public programme itself. In both cases, the social network of
mutual support was fragmented and dispersed, even producing
adverse effects in the family structure. The revenue generating
activities which were dependent on the central location of the
former settlement, the existence of a dense social network and the
accessibility to the transport network just did not exist in the new
settlement. Besides, the people affected did not participate at all in
the decisions related with their relocation process.
Last but not least, the efforts made and the creativity displayed
during four decades by the citizens were not only ignored, but also
destroyed by the authorities. Participants in focus groups claimed
that they had been forced to start from scratch. Indeed, interviewed
agents whowere responsible for each of these programmes (cases 1
& 2) recognized that people affected by these will have to remake
their lives by their own means.
Finally, several facts arose: the satisfaction of physical needs was
inadequate and insufﬁcient; economic, societal and political needs
were neglected; and interrelationships and synergies among the
elements of the demand system were inhibited.
4.2. Regarding supply
Citizens' problems become a pretext for implementing actions
that are ineffective in addressing the problems they supposedly
aimed to solve. Though case 1 was a national plan against ﬂooding,
90% of the action was concentrated on transforming the urban
outskirts of Dakar (Republique du Senegal eMHUCH, 2009) and it
only attended 3% of the ﬂooding victims. Furthermore, the hy-
draulic works undertaken were considered useless by some ex-
perts. Despite these questionable results, in 2011 “Jaxaay Plan II”
was initiated with the support of the World Bank. With regard to
case 2, the programme was intended to generate jobs, achieve
territorial equilibrium and improve urban mobility; however, the
outcomes are not clear. TheWorld Bank fears that the highway will
attract more activity and population to Dakar; the Director of
Eiffage-Senac warns that the highway will not solve Dakar's
mobility; and some experts, like Chang (2008), argue that this type
of programmes generate a greater economic dependence and in the
long-run hinder growth and job creation. Despite all these un-
certainties, the initiative was launched and it was awarded an
additional 83.7% funds over and above the initial budget
estimations.
The people affected by these actions have been impoverished,
while the promoters and implementers of initiatives increase their
wealth and their network of relationships. In case 1, the State
captured the added value of the land expropriated in Pikine as well
as the future land appreciation of the new settlements, not for
reinvesting it in the community but to gain a proﬁt. In case 2, the
Foreign Private Sector (FPS) will beneﬁt from building an infra-
structure. The Eiffage Group, in charge of building the highway,
beneﬁted from a 92.67% increase over the total cost initially esti-
mated. Likewise, the public sector decided to provide 83% of the
total investment, instead of the 64% initially agreed (Republique du
Senegal-APIX, 2007). Despite these changes, Eiffage-SENAC will
retain the highway concession for 30 years and will get a subsidy of
87 million FCFA for covering part of the toll cost in order to guar-
antee the project's proﬁtability. On the other hand, the World Bankand the African Development Bankwill beneﬁt fromdebt payments
generated by the money loaned to the Senegal Government and
Eiffage. Regarding the agencies in charge of preserving the rights of
the affected people (APIX, MSA and ENDA Ecopop), they saw their
budgets increased 9.6 times above initial estimations. By contrast,
the citizens did not come out so well off: compensations to families
diminished 40% with respect to initial agreements; the State took
on a debt that was 83% higher than planned; and once built the
highway will beneﬁt only 0.22% of the Senegalese people (see
Fig. 5).
Losses as well as gains have tended to be made invisible. Losses
suffered by people are considered to be “inevitable” while gains
obtained by promoters, implementers and contractors are consid-
ered to be “conﬁdential”.
Actions have been imposed through a hierarchical top-down
structure. With regard to stakeholders' involvement, in both cases
citizen participationwas restricted to informative actions. Thus, the
local government was entrusted with just gathering information or
informing the people.
In case 2, the facilitators (MSA and ENDA Ecopop) were
considered by the development agencies as the representatives of
the affected people, despite having been hired by APIX, the agency
in charge of implementing the plan. In fact, these agencies con-
strained their role to verifying compliance with Law 64e46, but not
with OP.4.12 (Alvarez, 2013). As a focus group participant stated:
“you don't bite the hand that nurtures you”.
In both cases, it is evident that the National Government took on
all responsibility through the programmes' implementers: the
Ministry (MHUCH) in case 1 and APIX in case 2.
Finally, it is worth noting that in case 2 its promoters intended to
conceal their actions. In one interview given during the research
project, a staff member of the World Bank in Senegal recognized
that nobody knows them since they work in a location which is
unknown to the general public. As a matter of fact, they do not even
sign the programmes that they ﬁnance, despite recognizing that
they have suggested the highway construction, they have promoted
the creation of the Presidential Investment Committee (PIC), and
they have helped the Government in searching for ﬁnancial funds
and in drawing up operational criteria in the OP.4.12. As a focus
group participant said: “It is like the decision-maker staying behind
a mirror, so that he can act without being held accountable for his
actions”. However, as the Dakar Governor said, in the event that
there was no compliance with OP.4.12, then the World Bank would
be co-responsible with the State for impoverishing the people.
In both cases, the affected people have expressed their suffering
caused by the consequences of the transformation programmes,
and their impotence in the face of the joint actions of the State, the
private sector and the ﬁnancial sector that have impoverished
them.
In conclusion, the supply side has evolved through a top-down
hierarchical structure in which the interests of the majority have
been displaced by the interests of those who promote and manage
resources (ODA, National Government and facilitators) and those
who beneﬁt from the process, the Foreign Private Sector (FPS). In
the meantime, the affected people are impoverished.
4.3. Regarding context
In both cases, the economic dependence increased, the territo-
rial model became more unbalanced, the urban model favoured
sprawl and segregation, and the social model preserved in-
equalities. In this context, the stakeholders involved in the pro-
grammes' implementation lost their legitimacy with citizens, while
other stakeholders (FPS, ODA) were not visible because they stayed
behind the Government.
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nor their participation in the decision-making process was pro-
moted. Consequently, development actions ended up responding to
the interests of those who manage resources and take decisions,
instead of attending the community wellbeing. Moreover, this
behavioural pattern aggravated the context conditions.
5. Findings from the application of the analytical framework
to the assessment of initiatives promoted by the citizens (case
3)
In this section, the ﬁndings from the application of the analytical
framework to the cases promoted by the citizens (case 3) are pre-
sented and discussed (see Fig. 6). As in the previous section, the
ﬁndings were obtained from the focus groups with the affected and
then cross-checked with both the stakeholders (through semi-
structured interviews) and the existing public documents.
5.1. Regarding demand
The leaders of the initiative took as their starting point that the
satisfaction of needs in an urban transformation process has to be
approached in an integral manner. In case 3, an improvement of
physical conditions was proposed as a means to strengthen the
socio-political needs of the community. The action sought to ensure
that the GRN citizens affected by the ﬂooding problem could
remain in the settlement and, consequently, make effective their
efforts to build their houses, manage their settlement and develop
economic activities. The GRN advisor on environmental issues has
recognized that since the action was initiated, nobody has been
forced to leave the settlement because of ﬂoods. The revenue
generating activities undertaken by GRN citizens keep thriving
because the settlement is strategically located and it enjoys a dense
and reliable social fabric. An action designed by the involvement of
all people affected has contributed to promote the understanding
among neighbours and it has strengthened the commune'sFig. 6. Display of functional system in cases 3.
Source: Authors.collective identity.
5.2. Regarding supply
The core of the action is based on the satisfaction of the integral
system of needs. ATD Fourth World and the local leaders constitute
the Flood Fighting Team (FFT). This team recognized the affected
people as the main agents of the transformation process and it
decided to support their efforts.
Therefore, the direct involvement of the people affected became
the key driver of the action. In 2009, the FFT built a drainage canal
network, but from 2010 on the GRN citizens took on the re-
sponsibility for building the canals, while the FFT maintains the
works.
Those who promoted the action chose to involve the affected
residents, so progress was achieved in a progressive way based on
dialogue among the affected. ATD and the local leaders gained the
acknowledgement of GRN citizens and became social mediators in
the commune.
The lack of support from the rest of stakeholders impeded an
effective satisfaction of the set of needs of the affected. Despite the
efforts undertaken by the affected and their supporters, no deﬁnite
satisfaction of the integral system of needs was achieved because of
lack of support from the rest of stakeholders (Local Government,
National Government and development agencies). Following the
action taken in 2009, the Local Government decided to participate
in building the canal network to ﬁght ﬂoods. In 2010, it invested
18,293 euro to build a canal which just represented 7% of the total
canal network and which could not be drained by gravity like the
rest of the system. According to the commune's Environment
Advisor, “this canal brought in more problems than solutions”. In
parallel to this collective initiative, the National Government went
on promoting the physical and social transformation of PIS, as
described in cases 1 and 2, by increasing the real estate pressure on
the commune and subsequently threatening to relocate GRN citi-
zens from their settlement.
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hierarchical bottom-up structure, in which ATD and local leaders
have supported GRN citizens in their efforts to satisfy their integral
system of needs. However, the major pitfall of this case was the lack
of involvement of other stakeholders (FPS and ODA) and/or the
participation of other stakeholders driven by their own interests
(National Government, Local Government and other support or-
ganizations). Both behaviours explain why it has not been possible
to give a proper response to the integral system of needs of the
affected people.
5.3. Regarding context
Case 3 was characterized by the use of local resources by all
residents, the preservation of a compact and integrated urban
model and the development of an equitable social model. More-
over, it has been observed that the stakeholders involved in the
action gained legitimacy among the GRN citizens affected and the
rest of the institutions.
In brief, the integral satisfaction of residents' needs and the
involvement of residents in the decision making process have been
promoted; however, due to lack of support from the rest of the
stakeholders, who either did not participate or simply acted ac-
cording to other interests, demand was not appropriately satisﬁed.
Nevertheless, this initiative has contributed to promoting residents'
autonomy, to preserving a compact and inclusive urban pattern,
and to granting legitimacy to the stakeholders who were involved
in the action.
6. Conclusions
This paper has shown the importance of analyzing whether
different types of policies, programmes and actions for trans-
forming the territory contribute effectively to satisfying in an in-
tegral way the needs of those affected and to improving the
conditions of the urban environment as a whole.
For that purpose, an analytical framework was designed to
analyze complex systems and assess the different ways of
responding (supply side) to the needs of the people affected (de-
mand side) within a given urban environment (context). The sys-
tematic application of this method to three case studies related to
the spatial and social transformation process experienced by the
largest self-made settlement in the urban periphery of Dakar has
drawn the following conclusions:
 Regarding demand, it has been shown that those actions in
which exogenous interests have prevailed over the satisfaction
of the integral needs of the people affected have ended up
impoverishing local residents.
 Regarding supply, it has been seen that those actions in which
involvement of people affected in the decision making process
has not been effectively promoted, have resulted in beneﬁting
those who manage resources and take decisions.
 Regarding context, it has been established that when no integral
satisfaction of the needs of the people affected and no effective
involvement in the decision making process take place, then
context conditions get worse; in other words, there is an in-
crease in economic dependence, environmental impacts, social
inequity and institutional illegitimacy.
The proposed functional system has shown its capacity to
analyze the complexity of real operational processes; that is the
positioning and relevance of each of the system's elements as the
interrelationships among elements. The analytical framework has
been particularly useful to assess the level of satisfaction of theneeds of people affected by the case study initiatives, their
involvement in the decisionmaking process and the impacts on the
urban context. Additionally, the tools employed to gather and
process information have allowed incorporating into the research a
wide range of stakeholder opinions, particularly of those who tend
to become invisible.
In brief, the methodological approach used in this paper has
proven useful in providing a more integral understanding of the
societal and spatial transformation processes which occur in places
with high urban growth, but no or negligible economic develop-
ment. This phenomenon exposes the myth of the supposedly per-
fect approach espoused by the international agency reports (World
Bank, 2000; Un-Habitat 2003, 2009) regarding the supposed
neutrality of stakeholders' relations. Some evidences arise from our
research:
 Despite the efforts made by the citizens themselves to improve
their neighborhoods, they were not recognized by the public
authorities. In fact, their actions were ignored or destroyed,
forcing them to start all over again in a new settlement which
was badly located and with much fewer facilities. Moreover, the
extremely low density of the new settlement became an
obstacle for the survival of productive activities and weakened
social networks. The people evicted from PIS have created the
roots for a new “informal” settlement which is likely to suffer
from another eviction cycle in the future.
 The National Government, instead of satisfying the needs of the
majority of the citizens, acted as “facilitator of capital accumu-
lation”, thus losing its legitimacy in front of the citizens. This
attitude means that citizens loose power since they do not have
any stakeholder eager to defend their interests in the decision-
making process.
 The development agencies, instead of trying to solve the prob-
lems of poverty and social exclusion, have contributed to
perpetuating them.
 Key ofﬁcial stakeholders such as funding agencies, national and
local authorities, private sector and NGOs bound themselves to a
strongly hierarchical structure, articulated in a top-down
fashion, which provided support to ﬁnancial promoters of
development actions. Hence, foreign private investors were
hidden behind other actors, such as the National Government,
thus in effect eschewing any responsibilities for the conse-
quences of the implementation of actions and programs pro-
moted by them.
Though the previous outcomes are derived from speciﬁc case
studies and, therefore, are context-dependent, similar results may
be expected from other cases in similar contexts.
In any case, the key challenge remains in deﬁning what is
“common good” in a real political context, where power forces are
unequal (Jenkins et al., 2007). Accordingly, it is recommended to
reﬁne the proposed method by applying it to other cases and
testing its validity. Additionally, it would be convenient to keep
researching how to strengthen the capabilities of citizens and
communities so that they get involved in the decision making
processes and break the inequality of power forces (Escobar 2005;
Frediani, 2007). To put it differently, we have to make an effort to
eliminate unjust and inappropriate policies which are imple-
mented in favour of a minority and to the detriment of a majority
(Harvey, 2012).References
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